Core-Periphery in Networks: An Axiomatic Approach by Avin, Chen et al.
Core-Periphery in Networks: An Axiomatic Approach ∗
Chen Avin § Zvi Lotker § David Peleg † Yvonne Anne Pignolet ‡
Itzik Turkel §
November 6, 2018
Abstract
Recent evidence shows that in many societies worldwide the relative sizes of the
economic and social elites are continuously shrinking. Is this a natural social phe-
nomenon? What are the forces that shape this process? We try to address these
questions by studying a Core-Periphery social structure composed of a social elite,
namely, a relatively small but well-connected and highly influential group of power-
ful individuals, and the rest of society, the periphery. Herein, we present a novel
axiom-based model for the forces governing the mutual influences between the elite
and the periphery. Assuming a simple set of axioms, capturing the elite’s dominance,
robustness, compactness and density, we are able to draw strong conclusions about
the elite-periphery structure. In particular, we show that a balance of powers between
elite and periphery and an elite size that is sub-linear in the network size are universal
properties of elites in social networks that satisfy our axioms. We note that the latter
is in controversy to the common belief that the elite size converges to a linear fraction
of society (most recently claimed to be 1%). We accompany these findings with a large
scale empirical study on about 100 real-world networks, which supports our results.
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1 Introduction
In his book Mind and Society [24], Vilfredo Pareto wrote what is by now widely accepted by
sociologists: “Every people is governed by an elite, by a chosen element of the population”.
Indeed, with the exception of some rare examples of utopian or totally egalitarian societies,
almost all societies exhibit an (often radically) uneven distribution of power, influence and
wealth among their members, and, in particular, between the elite and its complement, often
called the periphery or the masses. Typically, the elite is small, powerful and influential and
the periphery is larger, less organized and less dominant. This division is usually referred
to as a core-periphery partition [4]1 and the problem of identifying this partition has re-
cently received increased interest [26, 32, 16]. However, while the core-periphery structure
is perhaps the most high-level structure of society, it has so far not received a satisfactory
quantitative definition. In fact, it seems unlikely that a single formal definition exists that
suits all elite types in all social networks. Moreover, it is not clear that the elite must be
unique.
To illustrate this last point, let us consider the following mental experiment. Sort the
members of society by decreasing order of influence2, and add them to a set E (representing
the intended elite) one by one in this order. After the first step, E contains only one member
of society, albeit the most influential one, hence clearly it cannot yet be thought of as “the
elite” - it simply has insufficient power. This holds true also for the next few sets obtained
in this way. On the other extreme, if the process is continued to its conclusion, we end up
with E containing the entire society, which is clearly too large to be considered “the elite”.
The question is therefore: at which point along this process does E qualify as an elite?
Intuitively, the “break-point” where the process should be halted is the point where
adding new members into E no longer serves to significantly strengthen the group but rather
“dilutes” its power (relative to its size). This point is not well-defined, and depends to some
extent on the specific circumstances of the society. In this paper we propose a concrete
choice for this break-point, referred to as the power symmetry point of the elite. The core
and periphery are at their power symmetry point if the overall influence of the elite (nearly)
equals that of the periphery.
Our main contribution is a characterization of elites, i.e., a set of properties (formulated
as “axioms”) that any definition for an elite must adhere to. While this characterization does
not lead to pinpointing a single definition for the elite, it narrows down the range of subsets
1Hereafter we use the terms elite (mostly used for social networks) and core (used for any network)
interchangeably.
2The exact definition of “influence” is immaterial here, and will be discussed later on.
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Figure 1: Illustration of concepts via a fictional example using the social network of Marvel’s
superheroes. There is a link between two heroes if they appeared together in many comic
books [1]. (a) The network of the most highly connected 139 Marvel’s superheroes and
the 924 links between them, partitioned into a core (red vertices with red internal edges)
and a periphery (green vertices with green internal edges). Blue edges are “crossing” edges,
connecting core and periphery vertices. (b) The (dense) core subgraph (27 vertices, 252
edges). (c) The (sparser) periphery subgraph (112 vertices, 249 edges). (d) A representation
of the elite-periphery partition in the form of the adjacency matrix of the network (cf. [6]).
(e) The elite influence shift diagram, based on adding the 139 vertices to the elite in order
of their degree.
of society that are suitable candidates to be the elite, and moreover, it is powerful enough
to allow us to derive several conclusions concerning basic properties of the elite-periphery
structure of society.
Let us next describe two of our main conclusions. The first result, stated in Theorem 3.1,
is that elites satisfying the axioms of our model are at their power symmetry point. This
implies that the power of the periphery is similar to that of the elite, or in other words, that
as society evolves, the “natural” core-periphery partition maintains a balance between these
two groups.
Our second conclusion applies to the size of the elite. Recent reports show that the gap
between the richest people and the masses keeps increasing, and that decreasingly fewer
people amass more and more wealth [13, 23]. Claims like “The top 10 percent no longer
takes in one-third of our income – it now takes half,” made by President Obama [28] when
recently addressing the issue, are interpreted as implying that the economic and political
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elites become increasingly more greedy and overbearing. Such claims are often used in order
to criticize governments and regulatory financial institutions for neglecting to cope with
this disturbing development. The question raised by us is: can society help it, or is this
phenomenon an unavoidable by-product of some inherent natural properties of society? We
claim that in fact, one can predict the shrinkage of elite size with time (as a fraction of the
entire society size) based on the very nature of social elites. In particular, in our model,
such shrinkage is the natural result of a combination of three facts: First, society grows.
Second, elites are denser than peripheries (informally meaning that they are much better
connected). Third, the size of a dense elite at the power symmetry point is sub-linear in the
size of the society. Combining these facts implies that the fraction of the total population
size comprised by dense elites will decrease as the population grows with time. We prove this
formally in Theorem 4.2. The empirical evidence we present in this work lends additional
support to the above claim.
A dual question we are interested in concerns the stable size of the elite in a growing
society: How small can the elite be while still maintaining its inherent properties? We prove
that under our model, an elite cannot be smaller than Ω(
√
m), where m is the number of
network edges.
Consequently, we assert that the elite’s symmetry of powers and sublinear size properties
should indeed join the growing list of universal properties3 of social networks established in
recent years, such as short average path lengths (a.k.a. the “small world” phenomenon), high
clustering coefficients, heavy-tailed degree distributions (e.g., scale-free networks), naviga-
bility, and more recently dynamic properties such as densification and a shrinking diameter
[29, 2, 18, 21].
As a small illustrative example for the meaning of our terms we consider, in Figure 1
(a)-(c), the network of top 139 Marvel’s superheroes and the 924 links interconnecting them
(where two heroes are connected by a link if they appeared together in a story) [1]. We
partitioned this network into a core and a periphery as shown by the colors in Figure 1(a)4.
Several striking features can be clearly observed in this figure. First, the core (containing,
e.g., Captain America ,Spiderman and Thor) is dense and organized while the periphery is
much sparser and less structured. Second, despite their considerable size difference, both
the elite and the periphery have almost the same number of internal edges (≈ 250), thus
exhibiting what we refer to as a symmetry of powers. Third, the number of “crossing” edges
connecting the core to the periphery is almost twice as large (425), reaching most of the
3A property of a class of networks is universal if it keeps appearing in different types of networks and
contexts.
4The partitioning methods used, briefly described later on, are tangential to the current discussion.
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vertices in the periphery. Last, the size of the core is “only” 27 vertices (with 112 vertices
in the periphery). We argue, and support by evidence, that it makes sense to consider 27 as
about
√
924, and more generally, view the core size as roughly the square root of the number
of edges in the network. For almost all networks, a core of size about
√
m (where m is the
number of edges) will not grow as a linear fraction of the number of vertices5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of influence
and axioms. Section 3 discusses the property of power symmetry (Appendix B expands on
power symmetry in random graphs.) In Section 4 we analyze the size properties of the elite.
Section 5 presents our empirical results. Related work is provided in Section 6, and finally,
we conclude with a discussion in Section 7.
2 An Axiomatic Approach
The conceptual approach we adopt towards studying core-periphery properties diverges from
the established traditions in the field of social networks. The common approach to explaining
empirical results on social networks is based on providing a new concrete (usually random)
evolutionary model and comparing its predictions to the observed data. In contrast, we pro-
pose an axiomatic approach to the questions at hand. This approach is based on postulating
a small set of axioms, capturing certain expectations about the network structure and the
basic properties that an elite must exhibit in order to maintain its power in the society.
Two main advantages of the axiomatic approach are that a suitable set of axioms attaches
an “interpretation” or “semantics” to observed phenomena, and moreover, once agreeing on
the axioms, it becomes possible to draw conclusions using logical arguments. For example,
it may become possible to infer some information on the asymptotic behavior of a growing
network, which is not always clear from empirical findings.
The framework presented here for describing the elite-periphery structure in a social
network revolves around the fundamental notion of influence among groups of vertices. The
underlying assumption is that the elite has more influence than the rest of the population,
allowing it on the one hand to control the rest of the population, and on the other to
protect its members from being controlled by others outside the elite. We refer to these two
capabilities, respectively, as dominance and robustness.
5In fact, such growth can only occur in near-complete networks, which are rarely seen in real life.
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2.1 Influence and Core-Periphery Partition
We consider influence to be a measurable quantity between any two (not necessarily distinct)
groups of vertices X and Y , abstractly denoted by I(X, Y ). The groups X and Y do not
necessarily have to be distinct, and in particular, we are also interested in the internal
influence exerted by the vertices of a group X on themselves, denoted I(X,X).
Two central strengths of an elite in a given society are its dominance on the rest of
society on the one hand, and its resistance to influence by the rest of society on the other.
We will quantify these two aspects shortly. Denote the elite by a set E and the rest of society
(the “periphery”) by P . We call such a pair (E ,P) a core-periphery partition, and will be
interested in the four basic influence quantities I(E , E), I(P ,P), I(E ,P) and I(P , E).
Let us next lend the abstract notion of influence in social networks a concrete interpre-
tation. A social network is modeled as a graph G = (V,E), with a set V of n vertices
representing the members of society, connected by a set E of m edges. In a social network,
a network edge represents some social relation between the two connected vertices, such as
friendship, citations, following on Twitter, etc. For our purposes, we may abstract and unify
the interpretation of edges by simply stating that an edge connecting two vertices represents
some kind of a channel of influence between the two vertices. To reflect the self-influence of
every individual’s opinion on itself, we assume that each vertex has a self-loop, namely, an
edge connecting it to itself.
For every vertex v and set of vertices X, denote the set of edges connecting v to vertices
in X by E(v,X). Similarly, for vertex sets X, Y ⊆ V , let E(X, Y ) denote the set of edges
connecting vertices in X to vertices in Y . Define the degree of v with respect to X as
dX(v) = |E(v,X)|.
Given a partition of V to an elite E and a periphery P sets, we can now partition the
edge set E to four edge sets E(E , E), E(E ,P), E(P , E) and E(P ,P).

E(E , E) E(E ,P)
E(P , E) E(P ,P)

These sets correspond to the four basic parts of the block-model matrix representation
[14] of the adjacency matrix of a core-periphery network [6]. The adjacency matrix of the
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Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the four axioms. Elite vertices are gray. (A1) The elite’s
external influence (blue edges) dominates the periphery’s internal influence (black edges).
(A2) The internal influence of the elite is robust to the periphery’s external influence. (A3)
The elite is compact: a smaller elite (i) is preferred over a larger one (ii). (A4) The elite is
denser than the periphery.
network G can be now written as in the figure to the right. See also Figure 1(d) for an
example of such representation of the Marvel superhero network.
Now, for X, Y ⊆ V , define the influence of X on Y as
I(X, Y ) = |E(X, Y )| . (1)
Herein we consider only undirected graphs where I(X, Y ) = I(Y,X)6. Also note that due
to the existence of self-loops, if an vertex v belongs to both X and Y , then (v, v) ∈ E(X, Y ).
Hence in particular, I(X,X) ≥ |X| for every X ⊆ V .
A major question that we study is what a natural (E ,P) partition is and what are the
properties of the basic influence quantities. We use the following additional definitions.
Define the total influence of a group X in society as the sum of its internal and external
influence on the society:
I(X) = I(X,X) + I(X, V \X). (2)
6A more elaborate model may allow also for the possibility of directed edges, representing uni-directional
influence; this extension of our framework is left for future study.
6
Alternatively, I(X) = ∑v∈X dV (v).
Note that for undirected graphs I(E ,P) = I(P , E), so by Eq. (2)
I(E) = I(P) =⇒ I(E , E) = I(P ,P).
2.2 Core-Periphery Axioms
We now propose and state a set of four simple axioms to capture elite and periphery prop-
erties of a (E ,P) partition, illustrated in Figure 2 (A1)-(A4). Intuitively, to dominate the
rest of society, the elite E aspires to maintain a large amount of external influence on the
periphery P , higher than or at least comparable to the internal influence that the periphery
has on itself. Similarly, to maintain its robustness, hold its position and stick to its opinions,
the elite must be able to resist “outside” pressure in the form of external influence. To
achieve that, the elite E must maintain the internal influence that it has on itself higher
than (or at least not significantly lower than) the external influence exerted on it by the
periphery. Both high dominance and high robustness are essential for the elite to be able
to maintain its superior status in society. Moreover, all other things being equal, one may
expect the elite size to tend to be as small as possible. In social terms this may be motivated
by the idea that if membership in the elite entails benefits, then maintaining the elite size
as small as possible will increase the share coming to each of its members. We express these
requirements in the form of the following three axioms.
Let cd and cr be two positive constants.
(A1) Dominance: The elite’s influence dominates the periphery, or formally:
I(E ,P) ≥ cd · I(P ,P).
(A2) Robustness: The elite can withstand outside influence from the periphery, or for-
mally:
I(E , E) ≥ cr · I(P , E).
(A3) Compactness: The elite is a minimal set satisfying the dominance and robustness
axioms (A1) and (A2).
The forth axiom states that the elite members are better connected among themselves
than the periphery members. This assertion is justified by some of the classical elite defini-
tions, which state the elite is a “clique”’ where “everyone knows everyone”. (In fact, having
high density is a weaker requirement than being a clique.)
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Formally, define the density of a set X ⊆ V as δX = log|E(X,X)|/ log|X|. (Written
differently, this says that the number of edges internal to X is |E(X,X)| = |X|δX .)
(A4) Density: The elite is denser than the whole network, namely, δV /δE < 1.
Next, we discuss the implications of our axioms on power symmetry and elite size in
social networks satisfying our axioms.
3 Core-Periphery Power Symmetry
A key notion in this paper is the power symmetry point. Consider a social network G(V,E)
and assume some ordering pi (e.g., one reflecting influence via degrees or other centrality
measures) on the vertices of V . Start with the elite defined as the empty set, and the
periphery containing all the vertices of the network, namely, E = ∅ and P = V . One by
one, move the vertices from the periphery to the elite, according to the given ordering pi. As
this transition evolves, the influences of the elite and the periphery undergo a gradual shift,
where the internal influence I(E , E) increases, the internal influence I(P ,P) decreases, and
the cross influence I(E ,P) first increases and then decreases. This can be illustrated by an
elite influence shift diagram, such as the one in Fig. 1(e). The elite size for which the plots
of I(E , E) and I(P ,P) intersect is referred to as the power symmetry point of the network
and the ordering. More formally, a given partition (E ,P) is said to be at a power symmetry
point if
I(E) = I(P) .
(Similarly, (E ,P) is said to be near its symmetry point if I(E) ≈ I(P), i.e., the two are
equal up to a constant factor.)
Note that for a given network there are many partitions at a symmetry point. In fact,
for each ordering pi′ of the vertices there is an elite at a symmetry point, obtained by the
iterative process described above.
Assuming the first three axioms regarding an elite-periphery partition (E ,P) of an undi-
rected social network allows us to draw our first major result about symmetry.
Theorem 3.1. Let (E ,P)) be a core-periphery partition that satisfy the dominance, robust-
ness and compactness axioms (A1), (A2) and (A3). Then the partition is near its symmetry
point, i.e., I(E) ≈ I(P). Moreover, I(E) = Θ(m) and I(P) = Θ(m).
This means that for any elite that satisfies Axioms (A1)-(A3), the overall influence of
the elite, I(E), is (nearly) equal to the overall influence of the periphery, I(P), which makes
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the elite-periphery power symmetry a universal property and justifies the symmetry point
as a natural “candidate” breakpoint for selecting the elite. We expect this “symmetry of
powers” between the elite and the periphery to be recognized as a significant element in
understanding the internal balances in social networks.
To prove Theorem 3.1 we need a simple fact and two lemmas. Recall that the number
of edges in the graph is m. As (E ,P) forms a partition of the network vertices, we have
Fact 3.2. I(E , E) + I(E ,P) + I(P ,P) = m.
Lemma 3.3. If (E ,P) satisfies the dominance and robustness axioms (A1)-(A2), then for
some constants c1, c2 > 0,
1. I(E , E) ≥ c1 · I(P ,P),
2. I(E , E) ≥ c2 ·m.
Proof. By the two axioms, we have that
I(E , E) ≥ cr · I(P , E) ≥ crcd · I(P ,P),
implying the first claim with c1 = crcd.
Also, by Fact 3.2, combined with the two axioms,
m = I(E , E) + I(E ,P) + I(P ,P) ≤
(
1 +
1
cr
+
1
crcD
)
I(E , E).
Hence I(E , E) ≥ c2m for c2 = (1 + 1/cr + 1/(crcD))−1. The second claim follows. 
Let us next consider the implications of the compactness axiom (A3).
Lemma 3.4. If the elite E satisfies also the compactness axiom (A3), then I(E ,P) = Ω(m) .
Proof. We assume |P| ≥ |E|, or in other words |P| ≥ n/2. Since each vertex of P has a
self loop, I(P ,P) contains at least n/2 self loops. Combining this with Axiom (A1), we get
that I(E ,P) ≥ cd · n/2. Hence if the network has only a linear number of edges altogether,
say, at most 4n/c2 edges for the constant c2 of Lemma 3.3, then the lemma holds trivially.
Hence herafter we consider networks where
m > (4/c2) · n. (3)
Consider an elite E that satisfies Axiom (A3), i.e., it is a minimal set of vertices satisfying
Axioms (A1) and (A2). This implies that for every vertex v ∈ E , moving v from E to P
violates either (A1) or (A2).
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Let us first consider the case where there exists a vertex v ∈ E whose movement from E
to P violates the robustness Axiom (A2). In other words,
I(E , E)− dE(v) < cr · (I(P , E) + (dE(v)− 1)− dP(v)).
Rearranging, we get that
I(E ,P) > I(E , E)− (1 + cr)dE(v)
cr
>
I(E , E)− 2n
cr
.
Applying Lemma 3.3 (2) and Eq. (3) we get that
I(E ,P) > 1
cr
· (c2m− 2n) > c2
2cr
·m.
Next, let us consider the complementary case, where for every vertex v ∈ E , moving v
from E to P does not violate the robustness Axiom (A2). In this case, for every vertex v ∈ E ,
moving v from E to P necessarily violates the dominance Axiom (A1). This means that for
every vertex v ∈ E ,
I(E ,P) + (dE(v)− 1)− dP(v) < cd · (I(P ,P) + (dP(v) + 1)).
On the other hand we have by Axiom (A1) that
I(E ,P) ≥ cd · I(P ,P).
Adding up these two inequalities and simplifying,
dE(v) < (1 + cd) · dP(v) + 2 < 2dP(v) + 2.
Summing over all v ∈ E , 2I(E , E) < 2I(E ,P) + 2|E|, so
I(E ,P) > I(E , E)− |E| ≥ c2m− n ≥ c2
2
·m. 
Theorem 3.1 now follows by the above lemmas.
In fact, a slightly stronger observation can be made. For a compact elite E , we say that E
is over-dominant if for every v ∈ E , moving v from the elite to the periphery will not violate
the elites dominance (but will, necessarily, violate robustness).
Lemma 3.5. If a compact elite E is not over-dominant, then also I(P ,P) = Ω(m).
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Proof. Suppose E is compact but not over-dominant. Let c3 be the constant implied by
Lemma 3.4, namely, such that I(E ,P) ≥ c3 ·m. As in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we assume
that |P| ≥ n/2, hence I(P ,P) ≥ n/2. Hence if the network has only a linear number of
edges altogether, say, at most 4(1 + cd)n/c3 edges, then the lemma holds trivially. Hence
hereafter we consider networks where m > (4(1 + cd)/c3) · n, or equivalently
n <
c3
4(1 + cd)
·m. (4)
The fact that E is not over-dominant means that there is some v ∈ E whose movement from
the elite to the periphery will violate the dominance axiom (A1). Hence I(E ,P) + (dE(v)−
1)− dP(v) < cd · (I(P ,P) + (dP(v) + 1)). Rearranging, we get that
I(P ,P) > 1
cd
(I(E ,P) + dE(v)− (1 + cd)(dP(v) + 1))
>
1
cd
(I(E ,P)− (1 + cd)2n) .
By Lemma 3.4 and Eq. (4) we get
I(P ,P) > 1
cd
(c3m− (1 + cd)2n)
>
c3m
cd
− (1 + cd)2
cd
· c3m
4(1 + cd)
=
c3
2cd
·m.
The claim follows. 
Moreover, one can draw an additional interesting conclusion concerning a universal prop-
erty related to the power symmetry point.
Observation 3.6. For any ordering of the vertices and corresponding elite influence shift
diagram, the crossing influence I(E ,P) is maximized at the symmetry point.
This property is clearly observed in our empirical results (see for example Figure 1(e)
and Section 5), and we prove it formally for a very general random graph model known as
the configuration model (see Appendix B).
4 The Size of the Elite
The above discussion about the symmetry point leaves open the question of the elite size
in networks. In fact, there are networks for which the elite can be at a symmetry point
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but with significantly different sizes varying from linear size to
√
n. (see Figure 6). Our
first contribution in this direction concerns the question of how small the elite can be while
still preserving its properties. We show that once satisfying the axioms, the elite cannot be
smaller than Ω(
√
m).
Theorem 4.1. If (E ,P) satisfies the dominance and robustness axioms (A1) and (A2), then
|E| ≥ Ω(√m).
Proof. Graph-theoretical considerations dictate that
I(E , E) ≤ (|E|
2
) ≤ |E|2, implying that |E| ≥ √I(E , E). Combined with Lemma 3.3(2), the
theorem follows. 
We complement this result by providing an example of what we call a purely elitistic
society, where the elite reaches its minimum possible size of Θ(
√
m) in Appendix A.
In reality, however, most social networks are not purely elitistic, which leaves the question
of an upper bound for the “typical” elite unanswered: does the “universal” size of elites (if
exists) converge to a linear, or a sublinear, function of the network size? For illustration,
consider the US population of about 314 million people. An elite of 0.1% will consist of
314,000 people, while an elite of size
√
314M will consist of only about 18,000 people. These
numbers differ by an order of magnitude; which of them is more plausible?
Considering also Axiom (A4), we can clarify this important point and prove that the
elite size is sublinear.
Theorem 4.2. If (E ,P) satisfies the dominance, robustness and density axioms axioms
(A1), (A2) and (A4), then the elite size is sub-linear in the size of society, namely, |E| ≤
nδV /δE = nc for c < 1.
We find it remarkable that three simple and intuitive assumptions lead to such a strong
implication on the elite size. Note that Theorem 4.2 is in controversy to the common belief
that the elite size converges to a linear fraction of the society (most recently claimed to be
1% [25]). This discrepancy may perhaps be attributed to the fact that our axiom-based
approach characterizes the elite differently than in previous approaches. In the next section
we present evidence that many social networks and complex networks tend to have sublinear
elites.
Theorem 4.2 is derived from the following lemma. Recall that the density of a set X ⊆ V
is δX = log|E(X,X)|/ log|X|, so in particular
I(E , E) = |E(X,X)| = |E|δE . (5)
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We show that the elite density tightly determines its size.
Lemma 4.3. If (E ,P) satisfies axioms (A1) and (A2) and E has density δE , then |E| =
Θ
(
m
1
δE
)
.
Proof. By Fact 3.2, I(E , E) ≤ m. By Lemma 3.3, I(E , E) ≥ m/c′. Hence relying on Eq. 5,
we get m/c′ ≤ |E|δE ≤ m. The lemma follows. 
If δX = 2 we say that X is dense, i.e., in graph terms it is very close to a clique. In this
case, |E| = Θ(√m).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Symmetry Point and the Axioms
We investigated both the static properties of the network elites and their dynamics over
time. In total we analyzed about 100 social and complex networks. Their observed behavior
(w.r.t. elite and periphery relationships) is surprisingly consistent. While it is clear that the
issue of identifying the elite members of a given network is of paramount importance, with
some recent developments [26, 32], this issue is not discussed in the present work. Instead, in
order to conduct our experiments on given networks, we construct an approximation of the
elite, Ek, of size k. Once the k members of the elite are selected, the rest of the vertices are
considered as forming the periphery Pk (of size n− k), and the values of I(Ek, Ek), I(Ek,Pk)
and I(Pk,Pk) can be calculated directly. We use two known methods for approximating an
elite Ek of size k. The first method is based on the notion of the k-rich-club, and we denote
the size-k elite it generates for a given network G by E richk (G) (and omit G and rich when
they are clear from context). The second method relies on looking for a c-core in the network
[12], and it is a bit more complex. The two methods produce different elites (albeit with
some overlap). We present in the main text only the results for the k-rich-club elites, but
similar results were obtained when we used the c-core method (see Appendix C for details
on the results with the c-core method).
The k-rich-club [33] is perhaps the most intuitive and natural approximation for an elite
of size k. To build it for a given network G, we sort the network vertices according to
their degree, and choose the k highest degree vertices as the members of E richk (breaking
ties arbitrarily). Note that this method allows us to generate an elite for any desirable size
1 ≤ k ≤ n.
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Figure 3: (a) The elite influence shift diagrams (plotting the influence ratios I(E , E)/m,
I(P ,P)/m and I(E ,P)/m) for the k-rich-clubs of nine networks. The X axis is on a loga-
rithmic scale, where a point x (in [0,1]) represents a k-rich club of size k = nx. A point y on
the Y axis indicates the fraction I(·, ·)/m, where m is the total number of edges. The range
of x values between x0 such that k =
√
m = nx0 and x1, the symmetry point, such that
k = ksp = n
x1 is highlighted. (b) Networks nodes and edges numbers. (c) Median results of
the elite influence shift diagram for the k-rich-club elites for the 98 networks examined, for
increasing k.
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We present results from the 98 networks we evaluated. (Detailed results are shown
only for nine example networks, but the median values were calculated based on all the 98
networks studied.) For each network we considered an elite selection method (i.e., k-rich-
club or c-core) and then examined the influence and density of the elite and periphery and
validated the axioms for different elite sizes and networks.
We first consider the elite influence shift diagrams which presents the changes in I(Ek, Ek),
I(Pk,Pk) and I(Ek,Pk) as the elite (i.e., Ekrich(G)) grows from its minimum size of 1 to its
maximum size of n. Figure 3 shows the elite influence shift diagrams of the k-rich-club
for 9 networks and the median results of the k-rich-club for all of the 98 networks in our
experiments. Note that the X-axis is logarithmic and presented as k = nx where x goes from
0 to 1. The point x = 0.5 therefore indicates a
√
n-rich-club. To normalize the Y -axis for
different networks, each graph plots I(Ek, Ek)/m, I(Pk,Pk)/m, and I(Ek,Pk)/m. Observe
that the networks exhibit a similar pattern: the number of crossing edges between the elite
and the periphery, I(Ek,Pk), grows with the elite size k up to some maximum, and then starts
decreasing. An interesting and less obvious pattern is that I(Ek,Pk) is larger than I(Ek, Ek)
right from the beginning and remains larger until the maximum point. The relation between
these numbers changes only after I(Ek,Pk) begins to decrease, while I(Ek, Ek) continues to
grow.
As mentioned before, a particularly interesting point in these graphs is the symmetry
point, namely, the elite size, denoted as ksp, where the internal influence of the core and
the internal influence of the periphery are equal, i.e., I(Eksp , Eksp) = I(Pksp ,Pksp). Recall
that any elite that satisfies Axioms (A1), (A2) and (A3) must be near its symmetry point.
An important observation (stated earlier in Observation 3.6) is that I(Ek,Pk) achieves it
maximum at (or very close to) the symmetry point where k = ksp.
One of the main contributions of this paper is the claim that elites in social networks are
“small”, that is, of sub-linear size. We address this issue in detail shortly, but for now we
note that in Figure 3, for both the example networks and the median of all networks, the
symmetry point occurs mostly at elite sizes between n0.6 and n0.85, and its median value is
at about n0.77.
In all figures we highlight the range [x0, x1] of sizes for which it was shown that an elite
can satisfy Axioms (A1) and (A2). More explicitly, this range starts at the lower bound
on the elite size, i.e., the point x0 such that k =
√
m = nx0 , and ends at the symmetry
point, i.e., the point x1 such that k = ksp = n
x1 . Note that since each network has different
structure and different average degree, the values x0 and x1 are different for each network
(hence in Figure 3 (c), the leftmost point x0 of the highlighted range represents a median
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Figure 4: (a) Observed dominance ratio, dom(Ek), observed robustness ratios, rob(Ek) and
the observed density increase, dns(Ek) = δ(Ek)−δδ for nine example networks. The x axis is
logarithmic and marks the sizes of the k-rich-club elites with k = nx. The highlighted area
is Ek’s of sizes between k =
√
m and the symmetry point k = ksp (b) Median, Min and Max
results for 98 networks at k =
√
m and k = ksp. (c) Median results for 98 networks.
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value).
We now turn to the claim that small elites, and in particular that elites near the symmetry
point ksp satisfy Axioms (A1), (A2) and (A3), that is, they are dominant, robust and denser
than the whole network. Recall that by Thm. 4.2, if an elite satisfies these three axioms,
then its size must be sublinear. For a given network G with elite Ek (of size k) and periphery
Pk, define the observed dominance ratio of Ek on G as dom(Ek) = I(Ek,Pk)/I(Pk,Pk) and
the observed robustness ratio of E on G as rob(Ek) = I(Ek, Ek)/I(Ek,Pk). The observed
density of the Ek is denoted as δ(Ek). Note that the density of the network is δ(En) and is
denoted simply as δ. We define the observed density increase as dns(Ek) = (δ(Ek) − δ)/δ,
which indicates for each elite Ek the ratio by which it is denser than the whole graph.
Figure 4 (a) shows the values of the observed dominance and robustness ratios and the
observed density increase, dom(Ek), rob(Ek) and dns(Ek) respectively, for the nine example
networks G with k-rich club elites of different sizes k. Figure 4 (c) shows the median of these
values for all of the 98 networks.
The X-axis for each graph is again on a logarithmic scale, where an x value represents a
k-rich-club of size nx. We focus on values of dom(Ek) and rob(Ek) up to 1, and ignore higher
values. As before, we highlight in each figure the range of k for k-rich-club of sizes between
k =
√
m and the symmetry point k = ksp.
Although it is not necessitated by the model or the axioms, it is clear from the figures
that as the elite Ek grows in size, it attains more dominance over the rest of the network (the
periphery, Pk), namely, its observed dominance ratio increases, and its observed robustness
ratio grows as well. We therefore focus on the highlighted area of interest. One can see that
the social networks under study exhibit high values for both dom(Ek) and rob(Ek) at the
highlighted area. Recall that by our previous analysis, elites that satisfy Axioms (A1) and
(A2) are of size k ≥ √m. Hence the smallest possible size for an elite is k = √m and at that
size, one might expect the elites to exhibit relatively small values of dom(Ek) and rob(Ek).
Somewhat surprisingly, the calculated values are relatively high and are bounded away from
zero. For example, At k =
√
m, the elite of ’Buzznet’ has observed dominance ratio dom(Ek)
way beyond 1, and the elite of ’Digg’ has observed ratio of about 1, exhibiting high dominance
over the rest of the network. ’Pocek’, which exhibits one of the lowest observed dominance
ratios at k =
√
m, still has dom(Ek) of about 0.1, which is also reasonably high. Figure 3(c)
shows the median value of dom(Ek) of all 98 networks. At k =
√
m, this median value is
very high, about 0.6, exhibiting very high dominance of elites of this size. The dominance
of elites of size ksp at the symmetry point is even higher. All the example networks have
observed dominance ratios dom(Esp) > 1 so the median dom(Esp) value is also greater than 1
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at the symmetry point ksp. These empirical results show that in real social networks, elites
of size greater than
√
m and smaller than the symmetry point exhibit high dominance and
satisfy Axiom (A1). Similar results, albeit somewhat weaker, were obtained for c-core elites.
Observed robustness ratios exhibit a similar behavior to observed dominance ratios. For
small elites of size k =
√
m, all the example networks have observed robustness ratios well
bounded away from zero, and so is the median value for all 98 networks. The lowest value
of any of the example networks, observed for ’Flixter’, is rob(E√m) = 0.02. The highest
value, observed for ’Digg’, is 0.13. The median observed robustness ratio at that point is
about 0.1. At the symmetry point ksp the observed ratios are higher. For example, ’Pokec’
has an observed robustness ratio of rob(Esp) = 0.65, and the smallest value, observed for
’Flixter’, is 0.18. The median value at that point is about 0.45. Again, it follows that elites
of size greater than
√
m and smaller than the symmetry point in social networks have a high
robustness. Similar results, in fact somewhat stronger, were obtained for the c-core elites. In
general, elites produced by c-core exhibit lower dominance but higher robustness than those
based on k-rich clubs.
Another interesting observation that can be deduced from Figures 4 is that in almost all
the social networks that we tested, viewing elites of increasing size, we note that the elites
attain dominance before attaining robustness.
Turning to density, the figures clearly reveal that the density of the elite, δ(Ek), is sig-
nificantly higher than the density of the whole graph. The median results for 98 networks
exhibit that the elite at the symmetry point is about 20% denser than the whole graph. The
density at k =
√
m is even higher. Interestingly, Ek seems to reach its maximum density
around this point, when k =
√
m.
To conclude the discussion of Figure 4, we state that our empirical results provide strong
evidence that it is a universal property that the k-rich-club elite, at its symmetry point,
satisfies Axioms (A1), (A2) and (A4). From Theorem 4.2 we therefor conclude that ksp, the
elite size at the symmetry point, is a sublinear function of n.
5.2 The Scaling Law: Elite Size in growing networks
In the networks we examined so far, the sizes of the elites at the symmetry point (in both
the k-rich-club and the c-core methods) appear to be sublinear, and specifically, between
n0.6 and n0.85. Although this result was obtained for networks of different sizes, all of them
were static, and therefore the data collection does not allow us to ascertain whether the size
of the elite in the network’s symmetry point is indeed asymptotically sublinear.
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Figure 5: (a) The fraction of the elite at the symmetry point, from the whole population, as
the networks evolve over time. 4 examples. (b) Duration of the example networks (c) The
median out of 8 networks.
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To study this crucial question more carefully, we turned to data collected on dynamic
networks, namely, networks for which information is available on their evolution over time.
If the elite size at the symmetry point is indeed sublinear, then one should observe a decrease
in the relative size of the elite (its fraction of the network size) as the network grows.
Figure 5 presents the data collected for dynamic networks. We evaluated 8 networks for
which information was available about the creation time of each edge. Using this information,
we simulated the evolution of the network. As data on the appearance time of each network
vertex was not available, we made the assumption that each vertex has joined the network at
the same time when the first edge incident to it has appeared. We then divided the evolution
time of the network into 20 time frames, each corresponding to a time period during which
the network size increased by 5% of the total (final) network size. For each time frame t, we
calculated the elite Ek(t) and the symmetry point k = ksp(t) in the snapshot of the network
at time t. Figure 5 shows the ratio r = |Eksp(t)|/n(t) = ksp(t)/n(t) of the number of vertices
in the elite at the symmetry point, where ksp(t) is the elite size at the symmetry point at
time t and n(t) is the number of vertices in the entire network at time t. In each figure we
added the trend of
√
m(t)/n(t), where m(t) is the number of edges in the network at time
t. Clearly, unless the network is dense (i.e., with an order of n(t)2 edges at time t), the ratio√
m(t)
n(t)
converges to zero. Figure 5 (a) shows the results for four example networks out of the
8, and Figure 5 (b) shows the median result of all 8 networks. These figures demonstrate
that the elite size at the symmetry point is a relatively small fraction of the entire network
(starting at a median of 10% and ending at a median of 5%). Furthermore, it can be seen
that as the network evolves and grows, the ratio r decreases, following a pattern similar
to the function
√
m(t), implying that asymptotically indeed the elite size in the symmetry
point has a sublinear size.
6 Related Work
As identifying the most influential vertices in a network is crucial to understanding its mem-
bers’ behaviour, many studies considered a variety of notions related to the elite and core-
periphery decompositions (see [8] for a recent survey). Borgatti and Everett [4] measured
the similarity between the adjaceny matrix of a graph and the block matrix
(
1 1
1 0
)
. This
captures the intuition that social networks have a dense, cohesive core and a sparse, dis-
connected periphery. Core/periphery networks revolve around a set of central vertices that
are well-connected with each other as well as with the periphery. In addition to formaliz-
ing these intuitions, Borgatti and Everett devised algorithms for detecting core/periphery
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structures, along with statistical tests for verifying a-priori hypotheses [5]. Other efforts at
identifying such structures and decomposing networks include a coefficient to measure if a
network exhibits a clear-cut core-periphery dichotomy [16], a method to extract cores based
on a modularity parameter [10] a centrality measure computed as a continuous value along a
core-periphery spectrum [26], a coreness value attributed to each node, qualifying its position
and role based on random walks [11], a detection method using spectral analysis and geodesic
paths [9], and a decomposition method using statistical inference [32]. Mislove et al. [20]
defined the core of a network to be any (minimal) set of vertices that satisfies two properties.
First, the core must be essential for ensuring the connectivity of the network (i.e., removing
it breaks the remainder of the vertices into many small, disconnected clusters). Second, the
core must be strongly connected with a relatively small diameter. They observed that for
such cores, the path lengths increase with the core size when progressively including vertices
ordered inversely by their degree. The graphs studied in [20] have a densely connected core
comprising of between 1% and 10% of the highest degree vertices, such that removing this
core completely disconnects the graph. A recent article [31] argues that the core/periphery
structure is simply the result of several overlapping communities and proposes a community
detection method coping with overlap.
One of the first papers to focus on the fact that the highest degree vertices are well-
connected [33] coined the term rich-club coefficient for the density of the vertices of degree
k or more. Colizza et al. [7] refined this notion to account for the fact that higher degree
vertices have a higher probability of sharing an edge than lower degree vertices, and suggested
to use baseline networks to avoid a false identification of a rich-club. Xu et al. [30] shows
that the rich-club connectivity has a strong influence on the assortativity and transitivity of
a network. Weighted and hierarchical versions of the rich-club coefficient have been studied
in [19, 22, 27, 34].
The nestedness of a network represents the likelihood of a vertex to be connected to the
neighbors of higher degree vertices. Lee et al [17] defined a nestedness measure capturing
the degree to which different groups in networks interact. Yet another perspective is of-
fered in [15] where a network formation game and its equilibria are studied (benefits from
connections exhibit decreasing returns and decay with network distance).
7 Discussion
In this article we address the forces responsible for the creation of elites in social networks.
We provide axioms modeling the influence relationships between the elite and the periphery.
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We prove that at the power symmetry point, the size of the elite is sublinear in the size of
the network. In particular that means that an elite is much smaller than a constant fraction
of the network, evidence of which is often observed in the widening gap between the very
rich and the rest of societies. To understand better what these axioms mean in practice,
we studied a multitude of large real-world social networks. We approximated the elites by
rich-clubs of various sizes. Our findings indicate that in these networks, rich-clubs near the
symmetry point exhibit elite properties such as disproportionate dominance, robustness and
density as stated by the axioms.
Our results do not only advance the theoretical understanding of the elite of social struc-
tures, but may also help to improve infrastructure and algorithms targeted at online social
networks (e.g., [3]), organize institutions better or identify sources of power in social networks
in general.
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Appendix
A Extreme Elite Size
We have seen that a compact elite (satisfying axioms A1, A2, A3) has I(E , E) = Ω(m) and
I(E ,P) = Ω(m). A natural question is whether it is also guaranteed that I(P ,P) = Ω(m)
(which may imply a stronger version of a symmetry point than the one defined earlier). We
now demonstrate that unfortunately this is not the case. This is done by showing an example
of a family of graphs with elites satisfying Axioms (A1), (A2), (A3), where I(E , E) = Ω(m)
and I(E ,P) = Ω(m) but I(P ,P) = O(n).
We assume that the axioms are defined with constants cr, cd ≤ 1 and for simplicity we
assume also that cr = 1/b for constant integer b (can easily be modified to a rational cr, i.e.,
cr = a/b for constant integers a, b).
The construction of the graph uses a parameter Z (to be thought of as roughly n1/4),
namely, the graph family contains one graph GZ for any integer Z > 0.
The elite E consists of a complete network of ε = |E| = 4Z3−1 vertices. the periphery P
consists of |P| = 2bZε = 2bZ(4Z3−1) vertices with no connections between them (except for
a self-loop for each vertex). Hence altogether the graph GZ contains n = 8bZ
4+4Z3−2bZ−1
vertices.
Every vertex in E is connected to 2bZ3 vertices in P , and every vertex in P is connected
to Z2 vertices in E . Hence we have
I(E , E) = ε(ε+ 1)/2 = 2Z3(4Z3 − 1)
I(E ,P) = Z2|P| = 2bZ3ε = 2bZ3(4Z3 − 1)
I(P ,P) = |P| = 2bZ(4Z3 − 1) . (6)
Note that n = Θ(Z4) and m = Θ(Z6) = Θ(n3/2), and indeed I(E , E), I(E ,P) = Ω(m) and
I(P ,P) = O(n).
We need to verify that this construction satisfies the three axioms. Axiom (A1) says that
I(E ,P) ≥ cd · I(P ,P). This follows readily from Eq. (6) and the assumption that cd ≤ 1.
Axiom (A2) says that I(E , E) ≥ I(E ,P)/b. In fact, Eq. (6) establishes equality here.
To prove Axiom (A3), we need to show that every subset ∅ ⊂ E ′ ⊂ E violates either
axiom (A1) or (A2). Concretely, we show that it violates Axiom (A2), i.e., that
I(E ′, E ′) < I(E ′,P ′)/b.
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Consider some ∅ ⊂ E ′ ⊂ E and let X = E \ E ′. Note that
I(E ′, E ′) = I(E , E)− I(X , E ′)− I(X ,X )
I(E ′,P ′) = I(E ,P) + I(X , E ′)− I(X ,P)
hence we need to prove that
b · (I(E , E)− I(X , E ′)− I(X ,X )) < I(E ,P)− I(X , E ′)− I(X ,P) .
Let χ = |X | and ε′ = |cE ′| = ε− χ. Then plugging the quantities of Eq. (6), it remains to
prove that
b(2Z3(4Z3− 1)−χ(4Z3− 1−χ)−χ(χ+ 1)/2) < 2bZ3(4Z3− 1) +χ(4Z3− 1−χ)− 2bZ3χ .
Simplifying, we get that the above indeed holds for every χ < ε.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Extreme examples of elite-periphery partitions that satisfy our axioms and are
close to the symmetry point. In both networks we assume each vertex has a self-loop edge
that represents self-influence and is not drown for simplicity. Elite vertices are gray. (a) A
“purely elitistic society” example with 41 vertices of which 6 are the elite. One can extend
this example to a network of n vertices where the number of edges is m < 2n edges. The
elite then is of sub-linear size and consists of about
√
m ≈ √n vertices. But it is dense,
namely, the elite contains about m edges. The periphery also contains about m edges so
the partition is at a symmetry point. (b) A “purely egalitarian society” example of a grid
network with 49 vertices from which 11 are the elite. This example can be extended to a
network with n vertices and m < 4n edges. It can be shown then that every dominant elite
must be of size linear in n (and m). It follows that both the elite and the periphery will
have a linear number of edges and therefore the partition is close to the symmetry point.
Most social networks observed in reality exhibit neither of these extreme behaviors.
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B Symmetry in Random Networks
Let d = d1, d2, . . . , dn, where 1 ≤ di ≤ n − 1 be a positive degree sequence. A random
configuration graph G(n,d) is constructed in the following way over the set of vertices [n].
Let W = [2m] be the set of configuration points where m =
∑n
1 di/2 is the number of edges.
Define the ranges Wj = [1 +
∑j−1
1 di ,
∑j
1 di] for j ∈ [n]. Given a pairing F (i.e., a partition
of W into m pairs) we obtain a (multi) graph GF with vertex set [n] and for each pair
(u, v) ∈ F we add an edge (i, j) to GF where u ∈ Wi and v ∈ Wj. Choosing F uniformly
from all possible pairings of W we obtain a random (multi-)graph G(n,d).
For a given degree sequence d, define its symmetry point κ(d) as follows:
κ(d) = arg min
j
∣∣∣∣∣
j∑
i=1
di −
n∑
i=j+1
di
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Given d and an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ei denote the core as the vertex set [i] = {1, . . . , i} and
the periphery Pi as the vertex set {i+ 1, . . . , n}.
Theorem B.1. Let G(n,d) be a random configuration graph of given positive degree sequence
d and let κ be the symmetry point of d i.e., κ(d) = arg minj
∣∣∣∑ji=1 di −∑ni=j+1 di∣∣∣. Then,
1. E[I(Ei,Pi)] ≤ E[I(Eκ,Pκ)] for every i
2. E[I(Eκ,Pκ)] ≥ 4m/9
3. E[I(Eκ, Eκ)] ≥ m/9
4. E[I(Pκ,Pκ)] ≥ m/9
Proof sketch. Let D(k, l) =
∑l
i=k di/2m. Given a partition index i, the expected number of
edges of each component is the following:
E[I(Ei,Pi)] = 2D(1, i)D(i+ 1, n)m,
E[I(Ei, Ei)] = D(1, i)2m,
E[I(Ei, Ei)] = D(i+ 1, n)2m.
Now, since D(1, i) + D(i + 1, n) = 2m, the maximum value of D(1, i)D(i + 1, n) is when
i = arg minj|D(1, i) − D(i + 1, n)| which is exactly κ(d). What are lower bounds for the
three influences? Note that |D(1, κ)−D(κ+ 1, n)| will be maximized when dκ = n− 1 and
D(1, κ− 1) = D(κ+ 1, n) so the worst case is when D(1, κ− 1) = D(κ+ 1, n) = n− 1 and
dκ = n− 1, yielding the claimed result.
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C C-Core Results
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Figure 7: c-core elites: I(E , E)/m, I(P ,P)/m and I(E ,P)/m for 9 networks for increasing
kc and their medians for the 98 networks in our measurements. A point x on the X axis
shows a c-core of size kc = n
x, for x in the range [0,1]. The Y axis gives the percentage of the
measured value from the total number of edges. The range of x values between nx =
√
m
and the symmetry point is highlighted.
Section 5 described the results obtained when we examined the changes in I(E , E), I(P ,P)
and I(E ,P) for various elite sizes when the elites were chosen using the k-rich-club method.
29
In this section we consider the setting when the elites are chosen using the c-core mothod,
and show the results obtained in this setting.
As in Figures 3, we show the changes in I(E , E), I(P ,P) and I(E ,P) as the elite grows
from its minimum to its maximum possible size. In the c-core case, these sizes are determined
by the network structure, and cannot be set by us. Specifically, the minimum size is the
smallest possible kc > 0 and the maximum size is k1.
Figure 7 shows our results for nine example networks and the median results for the
c-cores of all 98 networks included in our experiments. Each graph contains three plots.
The first is for I(E , E)/m, the second is for I(P ,P)/m and the third is for I(E ,P)/m. The
X-axis for each graph is on a logarithmic scale, where an x value represents a c-core of size
kc = n
x. Although the results in the setting of c-core elites are not as consistent and smooth
for all networks as in the setting of k-rich-club elites, one can observe that the results here
are similar to those obtained in the k-rich-club setting. Here, too, most of the networks
exhibit similar patterns: as the elite size grows, I(E , E) grows as well and I(P ,P) decreases,
while the number of crossing edges I(E ,P) grows with the elite size up to some maximum
and then starts decreasing. Here too, I(E ,P) is larger than I(E , E) (almost) right from the
beginning and remains larger until the maximum point, and this relation changes only after
I(E ,P) begins to decrease (while I(E , E) continues to grow).
Figures 7 also show that in the setting of c-core elites, just as with k-rich-club elites (as
mentioned in Section 3), I(E ,P) attains its maximum at (or very close to) the symmetry
point.
Section 5 presented also the values of the dominance and robustness constants, ρd and ρr
respectively, for various elite sizes in the setting of k-rich-club elites. Here, we present the
corresponding results for c-core elites.
As in Figure 4 we show the changes in ρd and ρr as the elite grows from its minimum
to its maximum possible size. Figure 8 shows results for our nine example networks and
the median results for the c-core elites of all the 98 networks included in our experiments.
The X-axis for each graph is, again, on a logarithmic scale, where an x value represents a
c-core of size kc = n
x. There are two plots in each graph, one for the dominance constant ρd
and the other for the robustness constant ρr. We focus on values of ρd and ρr up to 1, and
ignore higher values. As before, we highlight in each figure the c-cores of sizes in the range√
m ≤ kc ≤ SP .
Clearly, elites chosen by the c-core method are different from same size elites chosen
by the k-rich-club method. Indeed, the results presented for the c-core setting are not as
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Figure 8: Dominance and robustness constants for the nine example networks and their
median for the 98 networks. The x axis is logarithmic and represents the sizes of c-cores
with k = nx. The higlighted area of x values corresponds to sizes between kc =
√
m and the
symmetry point.
consistent as in the k-rich-club setting. Nevertheless, our results show that the same basic
characteristics, namely, high dominance and robustness in elites of sizes in the range of√
m ≤ kc ≤ SP , hold also for c-core elites. It is worth mentioning that in the setting of
c-core elites, it does not hold for all networks that dominance is achieved before robustness.
Finally, turning to dynamic data, in Fig. 9 we repeated in the c-core setting the analysis
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Figure 9: The fraction of the elite at the symmetry point, from the whole population, as the
networks evolve over time. 4 examples and the median out of 8 networks. Elites are chosen
by c-core method.
of Fig. 5 from Section 5 for the k-rich-club setting. Specifically, we looked at the percentage
of the number of vertices in the elite, r = |Esp|
n
, for elite sizes |Esp| at the symmetry point.
We used the same assumptions made in Section 5 about the time information and followed
the same procedure as described therein. Fig. 9 depicts the ratio r as it evolves in time.
Figure 9 shows the results for four example networks (this is a different set from the nine
networks studied above, and the median result of all 8 networks for which evolutionary data
was available to us. Once again, the results in the setting of c-core elites are not as smooth
as in the setting of k-rich-club elites. Nevertheless, here too the figures demonstrate that the
elite size at the symmetry point is a relatively small portion of the entire network (starting
at median of 9% and ending at median of 6%). Furthermore, elites chosen by the c-core
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method exhibit similar behavior of evolution and growth as the k-rich-club setting. Here too
the ratio r decrease, implying that asymptotically, the elite size at the symmetry point is
indeed sub-linear.
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D Datasets
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
Academia
[35][143][144]
BGU 200169 1022441 5.1 10693 D Platform for academics to
share research papers.
Blog
[45][176]
ASU 88784 2093195 23.6 9444 U Social blog directory which
manages bloggers their blog
Blog2
[46][176]
ASU 97884 1668647 17.0 27849 U Social blog directory which
manages bloggers their blog
Blog3
[47][176]
ASU 10312 333983 32.4 3992 U Social blog directory which
manages bloggers their blog
Buzznet
[48][176]
ASU 101163 2763066 27.3 64289 U Photo, journal, and video-
sharing social media net-
work
Delicious
[61][176]
ASU 536408 1366136 2.5 3216 U Social bookmarking web
service for storing sharing
and discovering web book-
marks
Digg
[63][176]
ASU 771229 5907413 7.7 17643 U Social news website
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
Douban
[65][176]
ASU 154908 327162 2.1 287 U Chinese website providing
user review and recommen-
dation services for movies
books and music
Flickr
[76][176]
ASU 80513 5899882 73.3 5706 U An image hosting and video
hosting website web services
suite and online community
Flixster
[78][176]
ASU 2523386 7918801 3.1 1474 U Social movie site allowing
users to share movie rat-
ings discover new movies
and meet others with sim-
ilar movie taste
Foursquare
[79][176]
ASU 639014 3214986 5.0 106218 U Location-based social net-
working website software for
mobile devices. This service
is available to users with
GPS enabled mobile devices
such as iPhones and Black-
berries
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
Friendster
[80][176]
ASU 5689498 14067887 2.5 4423 U Social networking web-
site.The service allows users
to contact other members
maintain those contacts and
share online content and
media with those contacts.
Hyves
[87][176]
ASU 1402673 2777419 2.0 31883 U The most popular social
networking site in the
Netherlands with mainly
Dutch visitors and mem-
bers and competes in this
country with sites such as
Facebook and MySpace.
LastFm
[88][176]
ASU 1191812 4519340 3.8 5150 U Music website founded in
the United Kingdom in
2002. It has claimed over 40
million active users based in
more than 190 countries.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
LiveJournal
[91][176]
ASU 2238731 12816184 5.7 5873 U Virtual community where
Internet users can keep a
blog journal or diary
Livemocha
[93][176]
ASU 104103 2193083 21.1 2980 U The world’s largest online
language learning commu-
nity offering free and paid
online language courses in
35 languages to more than 6
million members from over
200 countries around the
world.
Twitter
[109][176]
ASU 11316811 63555749 5.6 564795 D Social news website. It can
be viewed as a hybrid of
email instant messaging and
sms messaging all rolled into
one neat and simple pack-
age. It’s a new and easy way
to discover the latest news
related to subjects you care
about.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
YouTube
[132][176]
ASU 13723 76765 5.6 534 U Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos
YouTube-2
[126][176]
ASU 13242 1940806 146.6 3068 U Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos
YouTube-3
[127][176]
ASU 11765 5574249 473.8 6745 U Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos
YouTube-4
[128][176]
ASU 10455 2239440 214.2 5958 U Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos
YouTube-5
[129][176]
ASU 13160 3797635 288.6 5759 U Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
AnyBeat
[39][162]
BGU 12645 49132 3.9 4800 D Online community. A pub-
lic gathering place where
you can interact with people
from around your neighbor-
hood or across the world
GooglePlus
[81][144]
BGU 211186 1141650 5.4 1790 D Google+ is a social network-
ing service and website of-
fered by Google
TheMarkerCafe
[107][143][144]
BGU 69413 1644843 23.7 8930 U Israeli online social network
site that allows its member
to connect and interact
arXivHep-thKDDCup
[40][150][146]
Konect 27769 352285 12.7 2468 D Citation network from
arXiv’s section on high
energy physics theory (hep-
th) as used in the KDD cup
2003.
BaiduInternal
[43][150][169]
Konect 2140198 17014946 8.0 97848 D Hyperlinks between the ar-
ticles of the Chinese online
encyclopedia Baidu.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
BaiduRelated
[44][150][169]
Konect 415624 2374044 5.7 127066 D ”Related to” links between
articles of the Chinese on-
line encyclopedia Baidu.
Catster
[52][150]
Konect 149684 5448196 36.4 80634 U This Network contains
friendships between users of
the website catster.com.
CatsterDogster
[53][150]
Konect 623748 15695166 25.2 80636 U Familylinks between cats
and cats cats and dogs
as well as dogs and dogs
from the social websites cat-
ster.com and dogster.com.
Also included are cat-cat
and dog-dog friendships.
CiteSeer
[57][150][137]
Konect 384054 1736172 4.5 1739 D Citation network extracted
from the CiteSeer digital li-
brary.
CoraCitation
[58][150][172]
Konect 23166 89157 3.8 377 D Cora citation network.
Continued on next page
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Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
DBLP
[59][150][161]
Konect 1103412 4225686 3.8 1189 U 913 Collaboration graph of au-
thors of scientific papers
from DBLP computer sci-
ence bibliography
Digg
[62][150][141]
Konect 30360 85155 2.8 283 D Reply network of the social
news website Digg
Dogster
[64][150]
Konect 426816 8543548 20.0 46503 U This Network contains
friendships between users of
the website dogster.com.
Epinions
[70][150][163]
Konect 131580 711210 5.4 3558 D 31 Trust and distrust network
of Epinions, an online prod-
uct rating site
Facebook
[72][150][174]
Konect 45813 183412 4.0 223 D 52 Directed network of a small
subset of posts to other
user’s wall on Facebook
Facebook-WOSN
[73][150][174]
Konect 63731 817090 12.8 1098 U 29 Friendship data of facebook
users
Flickr
[74][150][167]
Konect 2302925 22838276 9.9 27937 D 7 Social network of users and
their friendship connections
Continued on next page
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Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
FlickrLinks
[77][150][168]
Konect 1715255 15555041 9.1 27236 U Social network of Flickr
users and their connections.
HudongInternal
[85][150][169]
Konect 1974655 14428382 7.3 61440 D Hyperlinks between articles
of the Chinese online ency-
clopedia Hudong.
HudongRelated
[86][150][169]
Konect 2452673 18691099 7.6 204282 D ”Related to” links between
articles of the Chinese on-
line encyclopedia Hudong.
LibimsetiCZ
[89][150][151][138]
Konect 220970 17233144 78.0 33389 D Czech dating site. This is
the network of ratings given
by users to other users.
PrettyGoodPrivacy
[100][150][136]
Konect 10680 24316 2.3 205 U Interaction network of users
of the Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) algorithm.
Slashdot
[104][150][145]
Konect 51083 116573 2.3 2915 D 33 Reply network of technol-
ogy website
Continued on next page
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Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
SlashdotZoo
[106][150][152]
Konect 79120 467869 5.9 2537 D Signed social network of
users of the technology news
site Slashdot connected by
directed ”friend” and ”foe”
relations.
TRECWT10g
[108][150][135]
Konect 1601787 6679248 4.2 25609 D Web Research Collections
(TREC Web, Terabyte and
Blog Tracks)
TwitterICWSM
[110][150][140]
Konect 465017 833541 1.8 677 D Who follows whom on Twit-
ter.
USpatents
[111][150][148]
Konect 3774768 16518947 4.4 793 D Citation network of patents
registered with the United
States Patent and Trade-
mark Office.
WikipediaChinese
[117][150][169]
Konect 1930270 8956902 4.6 29005 D Network of hyperlinks
between the articles of
Wikipedia in Chinese.
Continued on next page
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Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
WikipediaEnglish
[118][150][166]
Konect 1870709 36532531 19.5 226073 D 75 Hyperlink network of the
English Wikipedia with
edge arrival times.
WikipediaLinksDE
[119][150]
Konect 3783012 68714064 18.2 437732 D Wikilinks inside the Ger-
man Wikipedia.
WikipediaLinksFR
[120][150]
Konect 4905934 104591689 21.3 1274642 D Wikilinks inside the French
Wikipedia.
WikipediaLinksIT
[121][150]
Konect 2790019 86754664 31.1 825147 D Wikilinks inside the Italian
Wikipedia.
WikipediaLinksJA
[122][150]
Konect 2140579 58200970 27.2 390239 D Wikilinks inside the
Japanese Wikipedia.
WikipediaLinksPL
[123][150]
Konect 1646203 41216900 25.0 215361 D Wikilinks inside the Polish
Wikipedia.
WikipediaLinksPT
[124][150]
Konect 2804569 51539953 18.4 628617 D Wikilinks inside the Por-
tuguese Wikipedia.
WikipediaLinksRU
[125][150]
Konect 2819989 64066427 22.7 587438 D Wikilinks inside the Rus-
sian Wikipedia.
Continued on next page
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Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
YouTube
[130][150][166]
Konect 3223589 9376594 2.9 91751 U 7 Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos. So-
cial network of users and
their friendship connections
Amazon
[36][175]
SNAP 334863 925872 2.8 549 U Based on ’Customers Who
Bought This Item Also
Bought’ feature of the Ama-
zon website. If a product
i is frequently co-purchased
with product j the graph
contains an undirected edge
from i to j.
amazon0302
[37][18]
SNAP 262111 899792 3.4 420 D Amazon product co-
purchasing network from
March 2 2003
amazon0312
[38][18]
SNAP 400727 2349869 5.9 2747 D Amazon product co-
purchasing network from
March 12 2003
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
as-Caida
[41][155]
SNAP 26475 53381 2.0 2628 D The CAIDA AS Relation-
ships Datasets, from Jan-
uary 2004 to November
2007
as-Skitter
[42][155]
SNAP 1696415 11095298 6.5 35455 U Internet topology graph,
from traceroutes run daily
in 2005
ca-AstroPh
[49][158]
SNAP 18771 198050 10.6 504 U Arxiv ASTRO-PH (Astro
Physics) collaboration net-
work
ca-CondMat
[50][158]
SNAP 23133 93439 4.0 279 U Arxiv COND-MAT (Con-
dense Matter Physics) col-
laboration network
ca-HepPh
[51][158]
SNAP 12006 118489 9.9 491 U Arxiv HEP-PH (High En-
ergy Physics - Phenomenol-
ogy) collaboration network
cit-Patents
[56][156]
SNAP 3774768 16518947 4.4 793 D Citations made by patents
granted between 1975 and
1999
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
cit-HepPh
[54][156][147]
SNAP 34546 420877 12.2 846 D Arxiv HEP-PH (high en-
ergy physics phenomenol-
ogy) citation graph. If a
paper i cites paper j the
graph contains a directed
edge from i to j
cit-HepTh
[55][156][147]
SNAP 27769 352285 12.7 2468 D Arxiv HEP-TH (high en-
ergy physics theory) cita-
tion graph. If a paper i cites
paper j the graph contains a
directed edge from i to j
DBLP
[60][175]
SNAP 317080 1049866 3.3 343 U Co-authorship network
from DBLP computer sci-
ence bibliography, where
two authors are connected
if they publish at least one
paper together.
ego-Gplus
[66][165]
SNAP 107614 12238285 113.7 20127 D Social circles from Google+
ego-Twitter
[67][165]
SNAP 81306 1342296 16.5 3383 D Social circles from Twitter
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
email-Enron
[68][160][149]
SNAP 36692 183831 5.0 1383 U Email communication net-
work from Enron
email-EuAll
[69][18]
SNAP 265009 364481 1.4 7636 D Email network from a EU
research institution
epinions
[71][170]
SNAP 75879 405740 5.3 3044 D General consumer review
site. An online social net-
work of Who-trust-whom.
flickr
[75][164]
SNAP 105943 2316952 21.9 5425 U Images sharing common
metadata on Flickr
higgs-twitter-friendship
[82][142]
SNAP 456631 12508442 27.4 51386 D Spreading processes of the
announcement of the dis-
covery of a new particle
with the features of the
Higgs boson on 4th July
2012.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
higgs-twitter-mention
[83][142]
SNAP 302523 436816 1.4 22790 D Spreading processes of the
announcement of the dis-
covery of a new particle
with the features of the
Higgs boson on 4th July
2012.
higgs-twitter-retweet
[84][142]
SNAP 425008 732790 1.7 31556 D Spreading processes of the
announcement of the dis-
covery of a new particle
with the features of the
Higgs boson on 4th July
2012.
LiveJournal
[90][134][159]
SNAP 4846609 42851237 8.8 20333 D Virtual community where
Internet users can keep a
blog journal or diary
LiveJournalCom
[92][175]
SNAP 3997962 34681189 8.7 14815 U Virtual community where
Internet users can keep a
blog journal or diary
Continued on next page
49
Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
loc-brightkite
[94][139]
SNAP 58228 214078 3.7 1134 U Location-based social net-
working service provider
where users shared their
locations by checking-in.
loc-gowalla
[95][139]
SNAP 196591 950327 4.8 14730 U Location-based social net-
working website where users
share their locations by
checking-in.
Oregon-1-1
[96][155]
SNAP 10670 22002 2.1 2312 U AS peering information in-
ferred from Oregon route-
views between March 31
and May 26 2001
Oregon-2-1
[97][155]
SNAP 10900 31180 2.9 2343 U AS peering information in-
ferred from Oregon route-
views between March 31
and May 26 2001
p2p-Gnutella31
[98][18][171]
SNAP 62586 147892 2.4 95 D Gnutella peer to peer net-
work from August 31 2002
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
Pokec
[99][173]
SNAP 1632803 22301964 13.7 14854 D Pokec is the most popu-
lar on-line social network in
Slovakia.
roadNet-CA
[101][160]
SNAP 1965206 2766607 1.4 12 U Road network of California
roadNet-PA
[102][160]
SNAP 1088092 1541898 1.4 9 U Road network of Pennsylva-
nia
roadNet-TX
[103][160]
SNAP 1379917 1921660 1.4 12 U Road network of Texas
slashdot1
[105][159]
SNAP 77360 469180 6.1 2539 D Technology-related news
website. Friend/foe net-
work. Obtained in Novem-
ber 2008.
web-BerStan
[112][159]
SNAP 685230 6649470 9.7 84230 D Nodes represent pages
from berkely.edu and
stanford.edu domains and
directed edges represent
hyperlinks between them.
The data was collected in
2002.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
web-Google
[113][159]
SNAP 875713 4322051 4.9 6332 D Nodes represent web pages
and directed edges represent
hyperlinks between them.
The data was released in
2002 by Google as a part of
Google Programming Con-
test
web-NotreDame
[114][133]
SNAP 325729 1090108 3.3 10721 D Nodes represent pages
from University of Notre
Dame (domain nd.edu) and
directed edges represent
hyperlinks between them.
The data was collected in
1999 by Albert Jeong and
Barabasi.
web-Stanford
[115][159]
SNAP 281903 1992636 7.1 38625 D Nodes represent pages
from Stanford University
(stanford.edu) and directed
edges represent hyperlinks
between them.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Data Repository n m
Average
Degree
Max
Degree
Undirected
Directed
Duration
(months)
Description
wiki-talk
[116][154][153]
SNAP 2394385 4659565 1.9 100029 D Wikipedia’s registered users
talk pages. A directed edge
from node i to node j rep-
resents that user i at least
once edited a talk page of
user j.
YouTube
[131][175]
SNAP 1134890 2987624 2.6 28754 U Video-sharing website on
which users can upload
share and view videos. So-
cial network of users and
their friendship connections
Table 1: List of All Tested Networks
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E Dominance and robustness
ρd ρr
Data
√
m SP
√
m SP
Blog 2.64 3.54 0.19 0.28
Blog2 6.52 6.16 0.17 0.16
Blog3 3.23 3.58 0.25 0.28
Buzznet 2.47 4.30 0.10 0.23
Delicious 0.35 2.62 0.04 0.38
Digg 0.88 1.96 0.13 0.51
Douban 0.18 4.50 0.07 0.22
Flickr 0.72 1.38 0.31 0.73
Flixster 0.40 5.50 0.02 0.18
Foursquare 1.20 2.35 0.04 0.43
Friendster 0.54 13.79 0.01 0.07
Hyves 0.32 6.28 0.02 0.16
LastFm 0.44 4.06 0.03 0.25
LiveJournal 0.33 3.07 0.02 0.33
Livemocha 0.81 2.57 0.10 0.39
Twitter 3.15 8.40 0.04 0.12
YouTube 0.51 1.89 0.07 0.53
YouTube 2 1.40 1.72 0.43 0.58
YouTube 3 2.66 2.16 0.60 0.46
YouTube 4 1.49 1.52 0.62 0.66
YouTube 5 3.21 2.39 0.60 0.42
Academia 0.27 1.65 0.06 0.61
AnyBeat 2.17 3.11 0.19 0.32
GooglePlus 0.38 0.91 0.19 1.10
TheMarkerCafe 1.46 2.60 0.18 0.38
arXivHep-thKDDCup Reference 0.45 1.34 0.10 0.75
BaiduInternal Reference 0.54 2.63 0.03 0.38
BaiduRelated Reference 1.02 2.86 0.19 0.35
CatsterDogster Social 1.08 2.32 0.17 0.43
Catster Social 3.57 4.12 0.20 0.24
CiteSeer Reference 0.19 2.12 0.01 0.47
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
ρd ρr
Data
√
m SP
√
m SP
CoraCitation Reference 0.30 1.83 0.05 0.55
DBLP Contact 0.09 1.36 0.07 0.73
Digg Communication 0.34 1.99 0.09 0.50
Dogster Social 1.32 2.93 0.11 0.34
Epinions Social 0.88 1.85 0.18 0.54
Facebook Communication 0.18 1.22 0.10 0.82
Facebook WOSN Social 0.25 1.13 0.16 0.89
FlickrLinks Social 0.62 1.19 0.22 0.84
Flickr Social 0.60 1.22 0.20 0.82
HudongInternal Reference 0.81 3.89 0.01 0.26
HudongRelated Reference 0.55 9.61 0.01 0.10
LibimsetiCZ Social 1.15 3.18 0.08 0.31
PrettyGoodPrivacy Contact 0.26 0.85 0.36 1.18
SlashdotZoo Social 0.63 2.14 0.11 0.47
Slashdot Communication 0.55 2.40 0.09 0.42
TRECWT10g Reference 0.54 3.46 0.01 0.29
TwitterICWSM Social 1.17 57.05 0.01 0.02
USpatents Reference 0.03 1.40 0.04 0.71
WikipediaChinese Reference 0.54 2.54 0.06 0.39
WikipediaEnglish Reference 0.73 3.07 0.03 0.33
WikipediaLinksDE Reference 0.58 2.62 0.01 0.38
WikipediaLinksFR Reference 1.00 3.16 0.01 0.32
WikipediaLinksIT Reference 0.99 2.62 0.03 0.38
WikipediaLinksJA Reference 0.72 2.57 0.03 0.39
WikipediaLinksPL Reference 0.63 1.97 0.08 0.51
WikipediaLinksPT Reference 1.17 3.19 0.05 0.31
WikipediaLinksRU Reference 0.76 2.24 0.02 0.45
YouTube Social 0.77 2.16 0.03 0.46
Amazon 0.07 3.05 0.01 0.33
amazon0302 0.07 2.14 0.02 0.47
amazon0312 0.11 2.42 0.01 0.41
as-Caida 2.18 6.03 0.07 0.17
Continued on next page
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ρd ρr
Data
√
m SP
√
m SP
as-Skitter 0.65 2.82 0.03 0.35
ca-AstroPh 0.35 1.17 0.20 0.85
ca-CondMat 0.23 1.41 0.11 0.71
ca-HepPh 0.34 0.42 1.49 2.41
cit-HepPh 0.31 1.62 0.07 0.62
cit-HepTh 0.45 1.34 0.10 0.75
cit Patents 0.03 1.40 0.04 0.71
DBLP 0.08 1.43 0.20 0.70
ego-Gplus 1.31 1.83 0.30 0.55
ego-Twitter 0.42 1.76 0.11 0.57
email-Enron 0.90 1.76 0.16 0.57
email-EuAll 4.13 10.07 0.05 0.10
epinions 0.76 1.65 0.20 0.61
flickr 0.35 0.93 0.55 1.08
higgs-twitter-friendship 1.06 3.45 0.02 0.29
higgs-twitter-mention 1.36 5.63 0.01 0.18
higgs-twitter-retweet 1.63 6.83 0.01 0.15
LiveJournal 0.12 1.04 0.10 0.96
LiveJournalCom 0.10 1.08 0.11 0.93
loc-brightkite 0.39 1.39 0.18 0.72
loc-gowalla 0.38 1.23 0.13 0.81
Oregon-1-1 2.81 5.86 0.08 0.17
Oregon-2-1 1.97 3.10 0.18 0.32
p2p-Gnutella31 0.09 2.27 0.02 0.44
Pokec 0.08 1.53 0.04 0.65
roadNet-CA 0.01 0.87 0.01 1.15
roadNet-PA 0.01 0.97 0.01 1.03
roadNet-TX 0.01 0.87 0.01 1.16
slashdot1 0.63 2.14 0.11 0.47
web-BerStan 1.12 2.30 0.01 0.43
web-Google 0.26 2.31 0.01 0.43
web-NotreDame 0.42 1.66 0.12 0.60
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
ρd ρr
Data
√
m SP
√
m SP
web-Stanford 1.14 2.56 0.01 0.39
wiki-talk 3.06 9.48 0.05 0.11
YouTube 0.57 1.96 0.04 0.51
Median 0.59 2.28 0.07 0.44
Average 0.95 3.41 0.13 0.51
STD 1.06 5.90 0.19 0.33
Min 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.02
Table 2: Domination and robustness values at the sym-
metry point and
√
m of all Networks.
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